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Abstract
Auctions have a long history, having been recorded as early as 500 B.C.. With the rise of
Internet, electronic auctions have been a great success and are increasingly used. Many cryp-
tographic protocols have been proposed to address the various security requirements of these
electronic transactions. We propose a formal framework to analyze and verify security proper-
ties of e-Auction protocols. We model protocols in the Applied Pi-Calculus and define privacy
notions, which include secrecy of bids, anonymity of the participants, receipt-freeness and
coercion-resistance. We also discuss fairness, non-repudiation and non-cancellation. Addi-
tionally we show on two case studies how these properties can be verified automatically using
ProVerif, and discover several attacks.
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1 Introduction
Auctions are a simple method to sell goods and services. Typically a seller offers a good or a service, and
the bidders make offers. Depending on the type of auction, the offers might be sent using sealed envelopes
which are opened at the same time to determine the winner (the “sealed-bid” auction), or an auctioneer
could announce prices decreasingly until one bidder is willing to pay the announced price (the “dutch
auction”). Additionally there might be several rounds, or offers might be announced publicly directly (the
“English” or “shout-out” auction). The winner usually is the bidder submitting the highest bid, but in some
cases he might only have to pay the second highest offer as a price (the “second-price”- or “Vickrey”-
Auction). In general a bidder wants to win the auction at the lowest possible price, and the seller wants to
sell his good at the highest possible price. For more information on different auction methods see [24].
Depending on the type of auction and the application different security properties might be interesting
to realize in an auction protocol and have been discussed in the literature. We identify the following main
security properties of auction protocols:
• Fairness: We propose the three following fairness properties: Firstly a fair auction protocol should
not leak any information about the other participants and their offers until the bidding phase is over
(so as to prohibit unfair tactics based on leaked information). We call this Weak or Strong Noninter-
ference, depending on if the number of bidders is leaked or not. Thirdly a protocol should not allow
anybody to win although they did not submit the highest price, i.e. ensure that the Highest Price
Wins. Otherwise a losing bidder could try to cheat to win.
• Authentication: For the seller it is crucial to ensure Non-Repudiation, i.e. that – after the winner
has been announced – the winning bidder cannot claim that he did not submit the winning bid.
Additionally we might want to ensure Non-Cancellation, i.e. that a bidder cannot cancel a submitted
offer before the winner is announced, to have binding bids.
• Privacy: We distinguish several different notions: Secrecy of Bids, Anonymity of Bidders, Receipt-
Freeness and Coercion-Resistance. Secrecy of Bids guarantees that the losing bids remain secret, or
at least cannot be linked to the participants. Anonymity of Bidders means that the participants, in
particular the winner, remain anonymous. Privacy is important in sealed-bid auctions to also prevent
information leakage after the auction is over, for example if an auction is organized in several rounds.
Receipt-Freeness ensures that bidders are unable to prove to an attacker (which might be another
bidder trying to force them to submit a low bid so that he wins) that they bid a certain offer, and
Coercion-Resistance means that even when interacting with a coercer, the bidders can still bid a
price of their choice.
• Verifiability: A verifiable protocol should allow the bidders to verify that the winner was correctly
determined, in particular if they lost. Additionally it might be desirable to give the bidders the ability
to contest if they think that their offers were not taken into account correctly. We do not consider
verifiability in this paper.
Related Work.
Many electronic auction (e-Auction) protocols have been proposed in the literature (see e.g. [8, 9, 10, 29]
for an overview). As case studies, we use the protocol by Curtis et al. [11], which uses a trusted registrar
and pseudonyms, and the protocol by Brandt [9], which is entirely distributed using secure multi-party
computation.
The different security properties have been discussed since the early publications on e-Auctions, e.g.
Franklin and Reiter [18] discuss secrecy of bids, anonymity of bidders, fairness, non-repudiation and non-
cancellation. Further publications [19, 21, 26, 28] have used and refined these notions, also adding verifia-
bility. Abe and Suzuki [2] introduced and motivated Receipt-Freeness for e-Auctions. Cancellation of bids
was also discussed by Stubblebine and Syverson [31] who proposed a protocol implementing cancellation
as a feature, and another protocol ensuring non-cancellation. Still, all definitions given in these papers are
informal.
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Although there has been much work on developing auction protocols and discussing properties, there
is considerably less work on their formal definition and analysis. Subramanian [32] proposed an auction
protocol and analyzed it using a BAN-style logic to show some security properties. In particular he showed
the atomicity of the transaction, weak secrecy of private keys and a form of anonymity modeled as weak
secrecy of the public key of the bidder. More recently Dong et al. [13] analyzed a receipt-free auction
protocol in the Applied pi-Calculus. They only considered privacy, in particular secrecy of the bidding
price and receipt-freeness, but only for losing bidders. Verifiability and accountability was formalized by
Kuesters et al. [20].
In the context of electronic voting there has been much more work on formal verification, in particular
in the area of privacy [4, 12, 15, 16, 17, 25, 30]. Some notions are similar, yet there are some fundamental
differences to auctions: In the case of voting the published result is the sum of all votes, hence there is a
certain leakage of information about all voters. For example if a candidate received no votes at all, this
increases the attackers knowledge about the voters’ votes as he can exclude this previously possible option.
Yet ideally there should always be some uncertainty about the votes, i.e. no voter’s privacy should entirely
compromised (apart from pathological cases such as an unanimous vote). In the case of auctions, the
public outcome is the winning bid(der), who loses all privacy. In some cases he might stay anonymous,
e.g. the well known “bidder on the phone”, but at least the winning price will be public. The other bid(der)s
however can remain completely private/anonymous – we only know that the offers are inferior. Fairness
also is a requirement in electronic voting as well as e-Auctions, but properties such as Non-Repudiation
and Non-Cancellation are specific to e-Auctions.
There has been a lot of work on Non-Repudiation in the context of contract signing protocols (e.g. [22,
27]). We rely on the work by Klay et al. [22] who propose many different flavors of non-repudiation based
on agent knowledge or authentication. We only consider “Non-Repudiation of Origin”, i.e. that the bidder
cannot deny that he made an offer, implemented as a form of authentication.
Contributions.
We provide the following main contributions:
• We give a formal framework in the Applied pi-Calculus [1] to model and analyze e-Auction protocols.
• We define the discussed fairness, privacy and authentication properties in our model and analyze
their relationship.
• We provide two case studies: The protocol by Curtis et al. [11] and a protocol by Brandt [9]. We
show how both can be modeled in the Applied pi-Calculus and verified using Proverif [5, 6, 7].
We discover several flaws on these protocols and explain how some of their shortcomings can be
addressed.
The full proofs are available in the appendix, and the ProVerif code used in the case studies is available
in [14].
Outline.
In Section 2, we recall the Applied pi-Calculus and model auction protocols. In Section 3, we formally
define the security properties. In Section 4, we analyze two protocols in our model before concluding in
the last section.
2 Preliminaries
We recall the Applied pi-Calculus and introduce our model of auction protocols.
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P , Q, R := plain processes
0 null process
P |Q parallel composition
!P replication
νn.P name restriction (“new”)
ifM = N then P conditional
else Q
in(u, x).P message input
out(u, x).P message output
(a) Plain process
A, B, C := active processes
P plain process
A|B parallel composition
νn.A name restriction
νx.A variable restriction
{M/x} active substitution
(b) Extended process
Figure 1: Grammars for plain and extended or active processes
2.1 Applied pi-Calculus
The Applied pi-Calculus [1] is a formal language to describe concurrent processes. The calculus consists of
names (which typically correspond to data or channels), variables, and a signature Σ of function symbols
which can be used to build terms. Functions typically include encryption and decryption – for example
enc(message, key), dec(message, key) – hashing, signing etc. Terms are correct (i.e. respecting arity
and sorts) combinations of names and functions. We distinguish the type “channel” from other base types.
To model equalities we use an equational theory E which defines a relation =E . A classical example
which describes the correctness of symmetric encryption is dec(enc(message, key), key) =E message.
Processes are constructed using the grammars detailed in Figure 1.
The substitution {M/x} replaces the variable x with term M . We denote by fv(A), bv(A), fn(A),
bn(A) the free variables, bound variables, free names or bound names respectively. A process is closed
if all variables are bound or defined by an active substitution. The frame Φ(A) of an active process A is
obtained by replacing all plain processes in A by 0. This frame can be seen as a representation of what is
statically known to the exterior about a process. The domain dom(Φ) of a frame Φ is the set of variables
for which Φ defines a substitution. An evaluation context C[_] denotes an active process with a hole for an
active process that is not under replication, a conditional, an input or an output. In the rest of the paper we
use the following usual notions of equivalence and bisimilarity based on the original semantics [1].
Definition 1 (Equivalence in a Frame [1]). Two terms M and N are equal in the frame φ, written (M =
N)φ, if and only if φ ≡ νn˜.σ, Mσ = Nσ, and {n˜} ∩ (fn(M)∪ fn(N)) = ∅ for some names n˜ and some
substitution σ.
Definition 2 (Static Equivalence (≈s) [1]). Two closed frames φ and ψ are statically equivalent, written
φ ≈s ψ, when dom(φ) = dom(ψ) and when for all terms M and N we have (M = N)φ if and only if
(M = N)ψ. Two extended processes A and B are statically equivalent (A ≈s B) if their frames are
statically equivalent.
The intuition behind this definition is that two processes are statically equivalent if the messages ex-
changed with the environment cannot be distinguished by an attacker (i.e. all operations on both sides give
the same results). This idea can be extended to labeled bisimilarity.
Definition 3 (Labeled Bisimilarity (≈l) [1]). Labeled bisimilarity is the largest symmetric relation R on
closed active processes, such that AR B implies:
1. A ≈s B,
2. if A→ A′, then B →∗ B′ and A′ R B′ for some B′,
3. if A α−→ A′ and fv(α) ⊆ dom(A) and bn(α) ∩ fn(B) = ∅, then B →∗ α−→→∗ B′ and A′ R B′ for
some B′.
In this case each interaction on one side can be simulated by the other side, and the processes are
statically equivalent at each step during the execution, thus an attacker cannot distinguish both sides.
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2.2 Modeling Auction Protocols
We model auction protocols in the Applied pi-Calculus as follows.
Definition 4 (Auction Protocol). An auction protocol is defined by a tuple (B, S, A1, . . . , Am, n˜) where
B is the process that is executed by the bidders, S is the process executed by the seller, and the Aj’s are the
processes executed by the authorities (for example an auctioneer, a registrar etc.), and n˜ is a set of private
channels. We also assume the existence of a particular public channel res that is only used to publish the
winning bid(der).
Note that we have only one process for the bidders. This means that different bidders will execute the
same process, but with different variable values (e.g. the keys, the bids etc.). To reason about privacy, we
talk about instances of an auction protocol, which we call auction processes.
Definition 5 (Auction Process). An instance of an auction protocol (B, S, A1, . . ., Am, n˜) is called an
auction process, which is a closed process
νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1 | . . . |Bσidkσbk |S|A1| . . . |Al),
where l ≤ m, n˜′ includes the secret channel names n˜,Bσidiσbi are the processes executed by the k bidders,
σidi is a substitution assigning the identity to the i-th bidder (this determines for example the secret keys),
σbi specifies the i-th bid and Aj’s are the auction authorities which are required to be honest.
In our definitions we use the context AP ′[·] which allows us to reason about bidders inside the auction
processAP , for example if we want to explicit bidders l and o, we rewriteAP asAP ′[Bσidlσbl |Bσidoσbo ].
The restricted channel names model private channels. Note that we only model the honest authorities
as unspecified parties are subsumed by the attacker.
By abuse of notation we write bl > bo to express that the bidding price determined by the substitution
σbl is greater than the one assigned by σbo , and maxi{bi} denotes the maximal price assigned by any
substitution σbi .
In order to reason about reachability and authentication properties we will use events. Events are
annotations, hence we extend the above plain process grammar as follows: P = event e(M1, . . . ,Mn).P
where e is the name of the event, and the terms M1, . . . ,Mn are parameters. These events do not change
the behavior of the processes, but allow us to verify properties such as “event bad is unreachable” or “on
every trace event a is preceded by event b”. In our definitions we will use the following events:
• bid(p,id): When a bidder id bids the price p the event bid(p,id) is emitted.
• recBid(p,id): When a bid at price p by bidder id is recorded by the auctioneer/bulletin board1/etc.
the event recBid(p,id) is called. This will be used to model Non-Cancellation, i.e. from this
point on a bid is considered binding.
• won(p,id): When a bidder id wins the auction at price p, the event won(p,id) is emitted.
For some of our definitions we need the following two transformations. The first one turns a process P into
another process P ch that reveals all its inputs and secret data on the channel ch.
Definition 6 (Process P ch [12]). Let P be a plain process and ch be a channel name. P ch is defined as
follows:
• 0ch =ˆ 0,
• (P |Q)ch =ˆ P ch|Qch,
• (νn.P )ch =ˆ νn.out(ch, n).P ch if n is a name of base type, (νn.P )ch =ˆ νn.P ch otherwise,
• (in(u, x).P )ch =ˆ in(u, x).out(ch, x).P ch if x is a variable of base type,
(in(u, x).P )ch =ˆ in(u, x).P ch otherwise,
1A bulletin board is a central append-only noticeboard that is often used for communication in protocols.
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• (out(u,M).P )ch =ˆ out(u,M).P ch,
• (!P )ch =ˆ !P ch,
• (ifM = N then P else Q)ch =ˆ ifM = N then P ch else Qch.
In the remainder we assume that ch /∈ fn(P )∪ bn(P ) before applying the transformation. The second
transformation does not only reveal the secret data, but also takes orders from an outsider before sending a
message or branching. This models a completely corrupted party.
Definition 7 (Process P c1,c2 [12]). Let P be a plain process and c1, c2 be channel names. P c1,c2 is defined
as follows:
• 0c1,c2 =ˆ 0,
• (P |Q)c1,c2 =ˆ P c1,c2 |Qc1,c2 ,
• (νn.P )c1,c2 =ˆ νn.out(c1, n).P c1,c2 if n is a name of base type, (νn.P )c1,c2 =ˆ νn.P c1,c2 otherwise,
• (in(u, x).P )c1,c2 =ˆ in(u, x).out(c1, x).P c1,c2 if x is a variable of base type, (in(u, x).P )c1,c2 =ˆ
in(u, x).P c1,c2 otherwise,
• (out(u,M).P )c1,c2 =ˆ in(c2, x).out(u, x).P c1,c2 where x is a fresh variable,
• (!P )c1,c2 =ˆ !P c1,c2 ,
• (ifM = N then P else Q)c1,c2 =ˆ in(c2, x).if x = true then P c1,c2 else Qc1,c2 where x is a
fresh variable and true is a constant.
To hide the output of a process, we use the following definition.
Definition 8 (Process A\out(ch,·) [12]). Let A be an extended process. We define the process A\out(ch,·) as
νch.(A|!in(ch, x)).
3 Security Requirenments
We can now give the formal definitions of our fairness, authentication and privacy properties.
3.1 Fairness Properties
A fair auction protocol should not leak any information about any participant until the bidding phase is
over and the winning bid is announced, and hence some information is inevitably leaked. We propose the
following two definitions:
Definition 9 (Strong Noninterference (SN)). An auction protocol ensures Strong Noninterference (SN) if
for any two auction processes APA and APB that halt at the end of the bidding phase (i.e. where we
remove all code after the last recBid event) we have APA ≈l APB .
This notion is very strong: Any two instances, independently of the participants and their offers, are
required to be bisimilar until the end of the bidding phase. This would also require two instances with a
different number of participants to be bisimilar, which will probably not hold on many protocols. A more
realistic notion is the following:
Definition 10 (Weak Noninterference (WN)). An auction protocol ensures Weak Noninterference (WN) if
for any two auction processes APA = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . | Bσidkσbk,A | S | A1 | . . . | Al) and APB =
νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,B | . . . | Bσidkσbk,B | S | A1 | . . . | Al) that halt at the end of the bidding phase (i.e. where
we remove all code after the last recBid event) we have APA ≈l APB .
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This only requires any two instances with the same participants Bσidi to be bisimilar, however bids
may still change. It is easy to see that (SN) implies (WN).
Another important fairness property is that there is no strategy that allows a malicious participant to
win the auction at a chosen price, independently of the other bids.
Definition 11 (Highest Price Wins (HPW)). An auction protocol ensures Highest Price Wins (HPW) if for
any auction process AP we have for AP ′[BσidAσbA | (BσidBσbB )c1,c2 ] where bA is the highest bid, there
is no trace containing the event won for bidder idB with a lower bid.
The idea is the following: We have an honest bidder BσidA who submits the highest bid. The attacker
has completely corrupted another bidder BσidB and should be unable to win the auction on his behalf on a
lower bid.
Note that these definitions can be applied independently of trust assumptions, and that different as-
sumptions can lead to different results: For example, a protocol might ensure (HPW) if the auctioneer is
trusted, but not otherwise.
3.2 Authentication Properties
The first authentication property we want to define is Non-Repudiation, i.e. that – once the winner has been
announced – a winning bidder cannot claim that the winning bid was not send by him. As discussed in
[22], Non-Repudiation can be expressed as form of authentication.
Definition 12 (Non-Repudiation). An auction protocol ensures the property of Non-Repudiation (NR) if
for every auction process AP on every possible execution trace the event won(p,id) is preceded by a
corresponding event bid(p,id).
The intuition is simple: If there was a trace on which a bidder would win without submitting the
winning bid, he could try to claim that he did not submit the winning bid even in a case where he rightfully
won.
Note two subtleties with this definition: Firstly, since only honest parties are explicitly modeled, it is
clear that only honest parties can emit events. Hence one could think that our definition implicitly assumes
some parties to be honest – however, this is not the case: If we do not trust the party that would normally
emit for example the event won, we can simply remove this party from the model and replace it with a new
party that receives the parameters on a special channel, and then emits the event using these parameters.
This gives the adversary total control about the events, as it would be the case for a distrusted authority.
Secondly we need to have session-dependent identifiers for the bidders in our events. This is to ensure
that the protocol only accepts bids that were submitted in a the same instance, and that an attacker cannot
submit a bid from a different session.
The second authentication property we model is Non-Cancellation, i.e. that a bidder cannot cancel a
submitted bid before the winner is announced.
Definition 13. An auction protocol ensures the property of Non-Cancellation (NC) if for any auction
process AP which contains a bidder (Bσidiσbi)
chc, i.e. a bidder which reveals his secret data on channel
chc (see Def. 6), and which submits the highest bid, i.e. ∀j 6= i : bi > bj , there is no trace containing the
events recBid(b_i,id_i) and won(b_w,id_w) for another, lower bid, i.e. bw < bi.
The idea is the following: The bidder idi submits the highest bid, so he should win. If however there
is the possibility that even though his bid was correctly received he did not win, this would mean that the
intruder was able to cancel the bidder’s bid even after reception. We require the bidder to reveal all his
secret data to the intruder to capture the fact that the bidder himself might want to cancel his offer, in which
case he could use his private data (keys etc.) to do so.
Note that technically we only defined Non-Cancellation for the winning bidder. This is sufficient since
in a first-price auction the other bids do not influence the outcome. Additionally it can be generalized to
other auction types by simply requiring that the winning price must be correct on all traces. This is to
ensure that no other bids that influence the result can be canceled.
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Both properties are independent: A protocol may implement the cancellation of bids as an official
feature, for example after all bids have been submitted, bidders could be allowed to cancel their bids for
a certain period of time, before the winner is finally announced. At the same time, such a protocol may
ensure non-repudiation of the winner using e.g. signatures.
Similarly a protocol may ensure Non-Cancellation but no Non-Repudiation if the submitted bids cannot
be canceled, but are not authenticated, so that the winner can successfully claim not having submitted the
winning bid.
Again, a protocol might ensure Non-Cancellation or Non-Repudiation for a certain trust setting, but not
for another.
3.3 Privacy Properties
BPU WA
SASBPS[13] P
SRF[13]
FPSBA
RF-U RF-WA
RF-SARF-BPS RF
FPSBA
CR-U CR-WA
CR-SACR-BPS CR
FPSBA
Figure 2: Relations among the privacy notions. A C−→ B means
that under the assumption C a protocol ensuring A also en-
sures B.
As explained in the introduction, we will
consider different notions of privacy and
analyze their relationship. We consider
Privacy, Receipt-Freeness and Coercion-
Resistance, and at each level two indepen-
dent axes:
• the winner may stay anonymous
(Strong Anonymity (SA, RF-SA,
CR-SA), Weak Anonymity (WA,
RF-WA, CR-WA)) or not (Strong
Bidding-Price Secrecy (SBPS, RF-
BPS, CR-BPS), Bidding-Price Un-
linkability (BPU, RF-U, CR-U))
• the bids may stay completely pri-
vate (Strong Bidding-Price Secrecy
(SBPS, RF-BPS, CR-BPS), Strong
Anonymity (SA, RF-SA, CR-SA)),
or there might be list of all bids, which are however unlinkable to the bidders (Bidding-Price Unlink-
ability (BPU, RF-U, CR-U), Weak Anonymity (WA, RF-WA, CR-WA))
These definitions are expressed for protocols implementing a first-price sealed-bid auction. We also provide
the generalized notions (P), (RF) and (CR), which can also be applied to other types of auctions such as
second-price auctions. We show that if a protocol correctly implements a First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction
(FPSBA), these notions coincide with the corresponding Strong Anonymity-notions (SA), (RF-SA) and
(CR-SA). Figure 2 provides an overview of the different notions.
3.3.1 Privacy.
The first privacy notion we consider was proposed by Dong et al. [13].
Definition 14 (Strong Bidding-Price Secrecy (SBPS) [13]). An electronic auction protocol ensures Strong
Bidding-Price Secrecy (SBPS) if for an auction process AP and any bids bA, bB < bC we have
AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidCσbC ] ≈l AP ′ [BσidAσbB |BσidCσbC ]
The intuition is the following: If the losing bids are private, a losing bidder may change his bid for
another losing one without this being noticeable to an attacker. This is expressed as an observational
equivalence between two situations where a losing bidder changes his bid. Note that BσidC does not
necessarily win since in AP ′ there might be a bidder offering a higher price, but bA, bB < bC guarantees
that BσidA loses.
We propose the following, slightly weaker notion of Bidding-Price Unlinkability, which allows the
losing bids to be public, however their link to the bidders have to be secret.
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Definition 15 (Bidding-Price Unlinkability (BPU)). An electronic auction protocol ensures Bidding-Price
Unlinkability (BPU) if for an auction process AP and any bids bA, bB < bC we have
AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidBσbB |BσidCσbC ] ≈l AP ′ [BσidAσbB |BσidBσbA |BσidCσbC ]
In this definition we require two situations in which two losing bidders swap their bids to be bisimilar.
This might be the case if the bids are public, but the real identity of the bidders is hidden, e.g. through the
use of pseudonyms.
Note that the previous two notions only concern the losing bids, yet we might also want to preserve the
anonymity of the winning bidder.
Definition 16 (Strong Anonymity (SA)). An electronic auction protocol ensures Strong Anonymity (SA)
if for an auction process AP and any bids bA, bB ≤ bC we have
AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidCσbC ] ≈l AP ′ [BσidAσbC |BσidCσbB ]
Here we require two situations to be bisimilar where two different bidders win using the same offer, and
the losing bidders may also use different bids in the two cases. This is stronger than Strong Bidding-Price
Secrecy (SBPS).
A slightly weaker notion is Weak Anonymity, which allows the bids to be public, however their link to
the bidders have to be secret, even for the winner.
Definition 17 (Weak Anonymity (WA)). An electronic auction protocol ensures Weak Anonymity (WA) if
for an auction process AP and any bids bA ≤ bC we have
AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidCσbC ] ≈l AP ′ [BσidAσbC |BσidCσbA ]
Here again two different bidders win using the same bid, but the losing bidder cannot choose his bid
freely as above - the two bidders swap their bids. This corresponds for example to a situation with a public
list of bids in clear, but where it is private which bidder submitted which bid. Weak Anonymity (WA) is
stronger than Bidding-Price Unlinkability (BPU) as even the winner remains anonymous.
All these definitions are only meaningful for first-price auctions. To also deal with second-prices sealed-
bid auctions, we can use the following generalization based on the published result.
Definition 18 (P |c). Let P |c = νc˜h.P where c˜h are all channels except for c, i.e. we hide all channels
except for c.
Definition 19 (Privacy (P)). An electronic auction protocol ensures Privacy (P) if for any two auction
processes APA = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . | Bσidkσbk,A | S | A1 | . . . | Al) and APB = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,B |
. . . | Bσidkσbk,B | S | A1 | . . . | Al) we have
AP1|res ≈l AP2|res ⇒ AP1 ≈l AP2
The intuition is quite simple: any two instances (consisting of the same bidders) which give the same
result, i.e. the same winning bid, have to be bisimilar.
It turns out that for a correct first-price sealed-bid auction protocol which only publishes the winning
price, this coincides with Strong Anonymity.
Definition 20 (First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction (FPSBA)). An electronic auction protocol implements a
First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction (FPSBA) if for any two auction processes APA = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . |
Bσidkσbk,A | S | A1 | . . . | Al) and APB = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,B | . . . | Bσidkσbk,B | S | A1 | . . . | Al) we have
APA|res ≈l APB |res ⇔ max
i
bi,A = max
i
bi,B
This definition requires the protocol to announce the same result if and only if the maximum among the
submitted bids is the same, independently of which bidder submitted which bid. It is easy to see that this is
true in the case of a correct first-price sealed-bid auction protocol. This allows us to prove the equivalence
of (P) and (SA).
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Theorem 1. If an electronic auction protocol implements a First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction (FPSBA), then
Privacy (P) and Strong Anonymity (SA) are equivalent.
Proof. Sketch: Assume we have two instances that give the same result, by (FPSBA) they have the same
maximal bid. This bid may have been submitted by another bidder, and the other bids might have changed,
butAP1 ≈l AP2 can be proved using successive applications of (SA). Similarly if we assume two instances
as in the definition of (SA), it is easy to see that they have the same maximal offer. Hence the result will be
the same, and we can apply (P) to conclude.
3.3.2 Receipt-Freeness.
A first Receipt-Freeness definition for auction protocols was proposed by Dong et al. [13]. It is a general-
ization of Strong Bidding-Price Secrecy (SBPS).
Definition 21 (Simple Receipt-Freeness (SRF) [13]). An electronic auction protocol ensures Simple Receipt-
Freeness (SRF) if for an auction process AP and any bids bA, bB < bC there exists a process B′ such that
B′\out(chc,·) ≈l BσidAσbB and
AP ′
[
(BσidAσbA)
chc |BσidCσbC
]
≈l AP ′ [B′|BσidCσbC ]
The intuition behind this definition is a follows: If the protocol is receipt-free, an attacker cannot
distinguish between a situation where a losing bidder bids bA and reveals all his secret data on a channel
chc, and a situation where the bidder bids bB and only pretends to reveal his secret data (the fake strategy,
modeled by process B′). Note that Simple Receipt-Freeness (SRF) implies Strong Bidding-Price Secrecy
(SBPS).
This definition has several shortcomings: Firstly, it ensures receipt-freeness only for one losing bidder,
whereas in reality several bidders might be under attack. Secondly, it does not necessary ensures the privacy
of other bidders: Consider for example a protocol that allows a losing bidder to create a fake receipt for
himself (e.g. using a trapdoor to generate a different decryption key), and that reveals all submitted bids
to the participating bidders (e.g. to enable verifiability). Such a protocol would be secure according to
above definition, but it would imply that a coercer can ask to a bidder to reveal the other participants
bids, violating their privacy. To address these issues, we propose the following notions, inspired by some
definitions developed for electronic voting [16] and the above privacy notions.
Definition 22 (RF-XXX). An electronic auction protocol ensures RF-XXX if for any two auction processes
APA = νn˜
′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . | Bσidkσbk,A | S | A1 | . . . | Al) and APB = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,B | . . . |
Bσidkσbk,B | S | A1 | . . . | Al) such that
• if XXX=BPS (Bidding-Price-Secrecy), there exists a j with bj,A = bj,B = maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B
and for any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . k},
• if XXX=U (Unlinkability), there exists j with bj,A = bj,B = maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B and a permuta-
tion Π with ∀i : bi,B = bΠ(i),A, and for any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . k},
• if XXX=SA (Strong Anonymity), maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B and for any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , k},
• if XXX=WA (Weak Anonymity), there exists a permutation Π with ∀i : bi,B = bΠ(i),A, and for any
subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , k},
there exist processes B′i such that we have ∀i ∈ I : B′\out(chci,·)i ≈l Bσidiσbi,B and
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
(Bσidiσvi,A)
chci
]
≈l AP ′B
[
|
i∈I
B′i
]
Consider the first case, (RF-BPS): In this definition any subset of losing bidders may create fake receipts
at the same time, and the other bidders can also change their bids. It is easy to see that this definition implies
Simple Receipt-Freeness (SRF).
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Similarly to our privacy definitions, we can also weaken (RF-BPS) and only consider cases where the
bids are merely unlinkable to the bidders, by only considering permutations of the bids: We obtain (RF-U).
The third notion (RF-SA) is stronger in the sense that we also allow the winning bidder to be under
attack, i.e. a winner needs to be able to create a fake receipt that proves that he lost, and a losing bidder
needs to be able to create a fake receipt that proves that he won. Note that an attacker might ask a losing
bidder to prove that he bid a certain price before the auction is over. If the bidder decides to bid less and
create a fake receipt, the attacker may notice that he got a fake receipt if for example the winning bid is less
than the price on the receipt. This is however an inherent problem of auctions, but our definition guarantees
that a losing bidder can create a fake receipt for the winning price once the auction is over and the winning
price is known.
Again, we can define a weaker version where the list of prices may be public, but it has to be unlinkable
to the bidders, even for the winner: (RF-WA). It is easy to see that (RF-SA) implies (RF-BPS) and (RF-
WA), and that both (RF-BPS) and (RF-WA) imply (RF-U).
Note that this definition implicitly assumes that all bidders not under attack are honest. If one also wants
to consider corrupted bidders, this can be modeled by replacing some of the honest bidders Bσidiσbi,X by
corrupted bidders (Bσidiσbi,X )
ci1,c
i
2 .
Finally, the following definition is a generalization of Receipt-Free Strong Anonymity (RF-SA) (analo-
gous to Privacy (P) and Strong Anonymity (Strong Anonymity)): Any two instance giving the same result
have to be bisimilar, even if bidders are under attack.
Definition 23 (Receipt-Freeness (RF)). A auction protocol ensures Receipt-Freeness (RF) if for any two
auction processesAPA = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . |Bσidkσbk,A | S |A1 | . . . |Al) andAPB = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,B
| . . . | Bσidkσbk,B | S | A1 | . . . | Al) and any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , k}, there exist processes B′i such that we
have
∀i ∈ I : B′\out(chci,·)i ≈l Bσidiσbi,B
and APA|res ≈l APB |res ⇒ AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
(Bσidiσvi,A)
chci
]
≈l AP ′B
[
|
i∈I
B′i
]
.
Similarly to Privacy (P), we prove that for protocols implementing a First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction
(First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction), Receipt-Free Strong Anonymity (RF-SA) and Receipt-Freeness coincide.
3.3.3 Coercion-Resistance.
Coercion-Resistance is a stronger property than receipt-freeness: The intruder may not only ask for a
receipt, but is also allowed to interact with the bidder during the bidding process and to give orders. We
can generalize the previously discussed Receipt-Freeness notions to Coercion-Resistance by adding the
new intruder power as follows.
Definition 24 (CR-XXX). An electronic auction protocol ensures CR-XXX if for any two auction pro-
cesses APA = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . | Bσidkσbk,A | S | A1 | . . . | Al) and APB = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,B | . . . |
Bσidkσbk,B | S | A1 | . . . | Al) such that
• if XXX=BPS (Bidding-Price Secrecy): there exists a j with bj,A = bj,B = maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B
and for any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . k},
• if XXX=U (Unlinkability): there exists a j with bj,A = bj,B = maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B and there
exists a permutation Π with ∀i : bi,B = bΠ(i),A and for any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . k},
• if XXX=SA (Strong Anonymity): maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B and for any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , k},
• if XXX=WA (Weak Anonymity): there exists a permutation Π with ∀i : bi,B = bΠ(i),A and for any
subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , k},
there exist processes B′i such that for any contexts Ci, i ∈ I with Ci = νc1.νc2.(_|Pi), n˜∩fn(C) = ∅ and
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
Ci
[
(Bσidiσbi,A)
c1,c2
]] ≈l AP ′A [ |
i∈I
(Bσidiσbi,A)
chci
]
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we have ∀i ∈ I : Ci [B′i]\out(chci,·) ≈l Bσidiσvi,B and
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
Ci
[
(Bσidiσvi,A)
c1,c2
]] ≈l AP ′B [ |
i∈I
Ci [B
′
i]
]
The difference to the previous receipt-freeness definitions is that the attacked bidders do not only reveal
their data on channel c1, but also take orders on channel c2. The context Ci models the attacker that tries to
force them to bid the price bi,A (this is expressed by the condition on Ci). The protocol is hence coercion-
resistant if there exists a counter-strategyB′ which allow the bidders to bid bi,B instead without the attacker
noticing.
For non sealed-bid first-price auction, we obtain the following definition.
Definition 25 (Coercion-Resistance (CR)). An auction protocol ensures Coercion-Resistance (CR) if for
any two auction processes APA = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . | Bσidkσbk,A | S | A1 | . . . | Al) and APB
= νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,B | . . . | Bσidkσbk,B | S | A1 | . . . | Al) and any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , k}, there exists
processes B′i such that for any contexts Ci, i ∈ I with Ci = νc1.νc2.(_|Pi), n˜ ∩ fn(C) = ∅ and
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
Ci
[
(Bσidiσbi,A)
c1,c2
]] ≈l AP ′A [ |
i∈I
(Bσidiσbi,A)
chci
]
we have ∀i ∈ I : Ci [B′i]\out(chci,·) ≈l Bσidiσvi,B and
APA|res ≈l APB |res ⇒ AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
Ci
[
(Bσidiσvi,A)
c1,c2
]] ≈l AP ′B [ |
i∈I
Ci [B
′
i]
]
Again we can prove that for protocols implementing a First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction (FPSBA), Coercion-
Resistant Strong Anonymity (CR-SA) and Coercion-Resistance (CR) coincide.
4 Case Studies
We applied the previously explained definitions on two case studies using ProVerif [5, 6, 7]: the protocol
by Curtis et al. [11], and the protocol by Protocol by Brandt [9].
4.1 Protocol by Curtis, Pierprzyk and Seruga [11]
The protocol by Curtis et al. [11] was designed to support sealed-bid first- and second price auctions while
guaranteeing fairness, privacy, verifiability and non-repudiation.
4.1.1 Informal Description.
The main idea of the protocol is the following: The bidders register with a trusted Registration Authority
(RA) using a Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI), which issues pseudonyms that will then be used for submit-
ting bids to the Seller (S). It is split into three phases: Registration, Bidding, and Winner determination.
• Registration: Each bidder sends his identity, a hash of his bidding price bi and a signature of h(bi) to
the RA. The RA checks the identity and the signature using the PKI, and replies with an encrypted
(using the bidder’s public key) and signed message containing a newly generated pseudonym p and
the hashed bid h(bi).
• Bidding: The RA generates a new symmetric key k. Each bidder will send c = EncpkS (bi), his bid
bi encrypted with the seller’s public key, and a signature of c, together with his pseudonym to the
RA. The RA will reply with a signature on c, and encrypts the bidders message, together with the
hashed bid h(bi) from phase one, using the symmetric key k. This encrypted message is then send
to the seller.
• Winner determination: After all bids have been submitted, the RA will reveal the symmetric key k to
the seller. The seller can then decrypt the bids, verify the correctness of the hash and determine the
winner. To identify the winner using the pseudonym he can ask the RA to reveal the true identity.
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4.1.2 Formal Model.
We modeled the protocol in ProVerif using a standard equational theory for symmetric encryption (func-
tions senc and sdec), asymmetric encryption (functions enc, dec and pubkey – which generates the
public key corresponding to a secret key) and signatures (functions sign, checksign and getmessage):
sdec(senc(m, key), key) = m
dec(enc(m, pubkey(sk)), sk) = m
checksign(sign(m, sk), pubkey(sk)) = m
getmessage(sign(m, sk)) = m
Due to space limitations we cannot include the full model here, the ProVerif code is available on our
website [14].
4.1.3 Analysis.
We assume a honest RA and an honest seller. We discuss the following properties:
Non-Repudiation (NR): To prove (NR), we have to show that on each possible trace the event won(p,id)
is preceded by the event bid(p,id). ProVerif can verify such properties using queries, in this case using
the query
query p:price,id:identity;
event(won(p,id)) ==> event(bid(p,id)).
This query means that for any value p of type price and any id of type identity, if the event
won(p,id) is recorded, it is preceded by the event bid(p,id). ProVerif finds the following attack:
Since the channel between the Registration Authority and the Seller is not protected, anybody can pretend
to be the RA and submit false bids, encrypted with a self-chosen symmetric key. After all false bids are
submitted, the attacker reveals the symmetric key and the seller will decrypt the bogus bids. Hence the
event won(p,id) can be emitted on a trace without any event bid(p,id). We propose a solution to
address this problem: If the messages from the RA to the seller are signed, the attacker cannot impersonate
RA any more and ProVerif is able to prove Non-Repudiation for the accordingly modified protocol.
Non-Cancellation (NC): Here we have to show that even if a bidder reveals his secret data to the intruder,
the intruder cannot cancel a submitted bid, i.e. there is no trace with the events recBid(p_1,id_a) and
won(p_2,id_b) where p_1 > p_2. To verify this we need to model at least two distinct prices, which
can be implemented using constants, i.e. by setting p_1 = max_price and p_2 = smaller_price,
where max_price and smaller_price are two constants such that max_price > smaller_price2.
Then we want to test the conjunction (not the precedence as above) of two events, which is not possible
directly in ProVerif. A well-known solution is to replace the underlying events with messages over a pri-
vate channel to a newly added processes which will call a conjunction event recBid_and_won once he
received all the messages. Then we can use the following query:
query event(recBid_and_won(max_price, id_a,
smaller_price, id_b)).
where the first two parameters are from the event recBid(p_1,id_a) and the second from the event
won(p_2,id_b), here instantiated with price constants as explained above and two constants for two
different bidders. For the original protocol, ProVerif finds a similar attack to the one described above: An
attacker can delete the messages sent by the the RA to the seller, and choose a symmetric key and send
bogus messages containing prices of his choice instead. When he reveals the symmetric key, a bidder of his
choice will win, hence there will be an event won(smaller_price,id_b) for a smaller price than the
one recorded by recBid(max_price,id_a). Even if we add signatures as proposed above, ProVerif
still comes up with an attack: A dishonest bidder might submit a first bid triggering the event recBid for
2Note that most auction protocols assume a finite number of possible prices anyway, which we can model using a list of constants.
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this bid, delete the forwarded message to the seller, and then submit a second bid at a different price. A first
attempt to fix this issue would be – as proposed in the original paper – by including the number of bids in
the message where the RA reveals the symmetric key. This would allow the seller to verify if he received
the correct number of bids. However the attack still works if two auctions take place in parallel: Since the
RA uses the same PKI in both cases, he will use the same keys. The malicious bidder could register in the
second auction, obtain the signed bid and replace his original bid with this message. The new message will
include a different pseudonym, but the seller has no means of verifying if a pseudonym corresponds to the
current auction. A solution would be to use different keys for different auctions (which need to be set up in
a secure way), but we were unable to verify the resulting protocol because of some limitations of ProVerif:
For example the counting of messages requires to maintain state information for the RA.
Noninterference: It is clear that the protocol does not ensure Strong Noninterference (SN) since an
attacker can simply count the number of messages to determine the number of participants. However we
can check Weak Noninterference (WN), i.e. that any two instances containing the same bidders and only
differing in the bids are bisimilar up to the end of the bidding phase, using the following query in ProVerif:
noninterf b_1, ..., b_n.
This query will ask ProVerif to verify strong secrecy of the variables b_1, ..., b_n., i.e. to check that
any two instances of the protocol that only differ in these variables are bisimilar. For the original protocol
ProVerif finds an attack which is based on the first message, which includes the hashed bidding price. An
attacker simply hashes the possible values and compares the result. If we encrypt this message using the
RA’s public key, ProVerif is able to prove Weak Noninterference (WN). This modification was proposed in
the original paper to achieve anonymity of bidders, but turns out to be also necessary to ensure fairness.
Highest Price Wins (HPW): Here we have to show that a malicious bidder cannot win the auction at a
chosen price, even if another bidder submitted a higher bid. Again, we will assume that we have a finite
number of possible prices. Then we can check the property using ProVerif by modeling two bidders, the
first one bidding max_price, and the second one is corrupted by the adversary (according to Def. 7). To
prevent the adversary from just winning using the highest possible price (which would not necessarily
correspond to an attack), we declare the constant max_price private3. We also have to be sure that
the protocol does not leak max_price before the end of the bidding phase (which would contradict the
intention of declaring it private). As we already showed Weak Noninterference (WN), we can be sure that
this is not the case. Hence we can check if the event won is reachable for the corrupted bidder id_B using
the following query
query p:price; event(won(p, id_B)).
Since bidder id_A submitted the highest possible price and the attacker cannot access and submit this
value, he should be unable to make id_B win the auction. For the original protocol – only corrected with
added encryption of the first bid to ensure Weak Noninterference –, ProVerif finds an attack again using
the fact that the messages from the RA to the Seller are not authenticated, hence an attacker can pretend
to be RA and submit bids of his choice to win the auction at a price of his choice. If we add signatures
again, ProVerif still comes up with an attack: A dishonest bidder might register twice and then replace the
message from the RA to the seller containing the correct bid with his own, bogus bid obtained using the
second registration. As above, this could probably be circumvented by counting the messages and using
different keys for different auction, but we hit again the limitations of ProVerif when trying to model and
verify the resulting protocol.
Privacy: The authors claim in the original paper that if the first message is encrypted, their protocol
ensures anonymity of the bidders. Yet we can see that it does not ensure Strong Anonymity (SA) since
after the symmetric key has been published, an attacker can obtain a list with hashes of all bids, which
3In the definition we did not requireA to submit the highest possible bid, but only a higher bid than anybody else. We could model
the existence of higher prices by defining additional private constants, but this would not change the verification task since they are
never used by any honest participants and are not accessible to the attacker.
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allows to distinguish h(bA), h(bC) from h(bB), h(bC). Hence we checked Weak Anonymity (WA) using
the choice[] operator in ProVerif, which verifies if the processes obtained by instantiating a variable
with two different values are bisimilar. More precisely, we can check if for two swapping bidders (the
first bidder bids b_A = choice[b_1,b_2], the second b_B = choice[b_2,b_1]) the resulting
processes are bisimilar. This query leads to another possible attack: The intruder might delay the messages
from the second bidder. He waits until the first bidder sent his final message and this was relayed to the
seller by the RA. This allows the attacker to link this message to the first bidder and distinguish both cases
based on the hash after decrypting the message using the published symmetric key. This type of attack is
well-known in electronic voting [12]. As a solution, we have to ensure that both messages to the seller are
sent at exactly the same time using synchronization. Inspired by some techniques used in ProSwapper [23],
we prove that the accordingly modified protocol ensures Weak Anonymity (WA).
It is also clear that the protocol is neither Receipt-Free nor Coercion-Resistant for any of the proposed
notions since the hashed bidding price in the first message can be used as a receipt. Even if this message
is encrypted, the data used to encrypt (keys, random values) can be used as a receipt. Note that for all
properties ProVerif responds in less than a second on a standard PC.
4.2 Protocol by Brandt [9]
The protocol by Brandt [9] was designed to ensure full privacy in a completely distributed way. It ex-
ploits the homomorphic properties of a distributed El-Gamal Encryption scheme for a secure multi-party
computation of the winner.
4.2.1 Informal Description.
The participating bidders and the seller communicate using a bulletin board, i.e. an append-only memory
accessible for everybody. The bids are encoded as bit-vectors where each entry corresponds to a price. The
protocol then uses linear algebra operations on the bid vectors to compute a function fi, which returns a
vector containing one zero if the bidder i submitted the highest bid, and only random numbers otherwise.
To be able to compute this function in a completely distributed way, and to guarantee that no coalition
of malicious bidders can break privacy, these computations are performed on the encrypted bids using
homomorphic properties of a distributed El-Gamal Encryption.
In a nutshell, the protocol realizes the following steps:
1. Firstly, the distributed key is generated: each bidder chooses his part of the secret key and publishes
the corresponding part of the public key on the bulletin board.
2. Each bidder then computes the joint public key, encrypts his offer using this key and publishes it on
the bulletin board.
3. Then the auction function f is calculated for every bidder using some operations exploiting the
homomorphic property of the encryption scheme.
4. The outcome of this computation (n encrypted values) are published on the bulletin board, and each
bidder partly decrypts each value using his secret key.
5. These shares are posted on the bulletin board, and can be combined to obtain the result.
4.2.2 Formal Model.
Modeling the exchanged messages is straightforward (see [14] for the ProVerif code). Modeling the dis-
tributed encryption scheme and the distributed computations is a more challenging task since a too abstract
model might miss attacks, whereas a too fine-grained model can lead to non-termination or false attacks.
The protocol assumes a finite set of possible prices, which we will model as constants p_1,...,p_n.
Assuming q bidders, we can define the following equational theory to model steps 3 and 4 of the protocol:
f(enc(b_1, pkey, r_1), ..., enc(b_q, pkey, r_q), sk_i)
= share(( maxi{b_i}, arg maxi{b_i}), (b_1, ..., b_q), pkey, sk_i, g(r_1, .., r_q))
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This equation models the following properties of the function f: If we have bids b_1, ..., b_q encrypted
using the same joint public key pkey, some random values r_1, ... ,r_q, and a part sk_i of the secret
key we obtain a share of the function outcome, i.e. the tuple (winning price, id of the winner), for the same
public and secret keys and a function of the used random values. Since the share will look slightly different
depending on the bids even if winning bid is the same, we also include b_1,...,b_q in the share. This
is necessary to avoid false attacks in ProVerif. The next equation corresponds to step 5 of the protocol
and uses the function combine(pk(k_1), ..., pk(k_q)) which models the computation of the joint
public key based on the individual ones.
dec(share(m, x_1, combine(pk(k_1), ..., pk(k_q)), k_1, r_1), ...,
share(m, x_q, combine(pk(k_1), ..., pk(k_q)), k_q, r_q)) = m
The equation models that knowing all shares of the function outcome allows to decrypt it, if
• all shares have been constructed using the same joint public key, which was computed using the
function combine from the individual public keys, and
• the individual public keys were computed from the same secret keys that were used to compute the
shares.
Since the number of different prices n and the number of participants q are finite, we can enumerate all
possible equations. In particular we can list all possible parameters of the function f, which allows us to
enumerate all instances and replace the max and arg max functions which their actual values. This yields
a convergent equational theory, which allows ProVerif to verify all the tested properties in less than one
second.
4.2.3 Analysis.
We use the same ProVerif techniques we discussed in the previous section. Essentially the protocol ensures
none of the defined properties, mainly due the lack of authentication, even if all parties are trusted. The
attacker can simulate a completely different protocol execution towards the seller (i.e. setting up keys,
encrypting bids of his choice, doing the calculation, and publishing the shares), which allows attacks on
Non-Repudiation (a trace with event won, but without event bid), Non-Cancellation (a trace with event
recBid and event won with a different, lower bid from the same bidder) and Highest Price Wins (the
event won with a lower bid from a corrupted bidder is reachable).
Although the protocol claims to be fully private, ProVerif finds an attack that allows to completely
uncover a bidder’s bid: Since there is no authentication, an intruder can simulate all other parties with
respect to a participant. He will generate secret keys, publish the according public keys and on reception
of the attacked bidder’s bid, simply copy it and claim that it is his own bid. Then the joint computation
and decryption will take place, and the announced winning price will be attacked bidder’s offer, which is
hence public. Note that this is not an attack on the security of the computation, but on the structure of the
protocol.
It is also clear that the protocol does not ensure Strong Noninterference since the number of participants
is public, which allows to distinguish instances with different number of participants. However we prove
Weak Noninterference using choice[] (the use of noninterf leads to false attacks). The ProVerif-
code is available in [14].
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We provided a framework to formally verify security properties in e-Auction protocols. In particular we
discussed how protocols can be modeled in the Applied pi-Calculus and how security properties such as
different notions of Privacy, Fairness and Authentication can be expressed. We analyzed the relationship
between the different notions and detailed a hierarchy of privacy notions (Fig. 2).
Using two case studies [9, 11], we showed how our definitions can be applied on existing protocols and
are suitable for automated analysis using ProVerif. The results were surprising: One of the two protocols
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provided none of our security notions without modifications, the other protocol only one. It was particu-
larly interesting to see that even the protocol by Brandt did not ensure privacy, although it was especially
designed with privacy in mind. The discovered flaw is however not an attack on the cryptographic primitive
used, but on the protocol architecture. This underlines again the complexity of designing secure protocols:
A combination of secure building blocks can be insecure. In case of the protocol by Curtis et al. we also
subsequently discussed several modifications to improve security.
As future work, we would like to verify Non-Cancellation and Highest Price Wins on the modified
protocol by Curtis et al., which was not possible directly in ProVerif. There exist extensions which allow
to model states, e.g. StatVerif [3] which might be used in this case.
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A Proof of “(SN) implies (WN)”
Proof. We have to show that for any two auction processes APA = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . | Bσidkσbk,A |
S | A1 | . . . | Al) and APB = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,B | . . . | Bσidkσbk,B | S | A1 | . . . | Al) that halt at the end
of the bidding phase (i.e. where we remove all code after the last recBid event) we have APA ≈l APB .
By (SN) we have that for any two auction processes APA and APB that halt at the end of the bidding
phase (i.e. where we remove all code after the last recBid event) we have APA ≈l APB , hence we can
conclude directly.
B Proof of “(SA) implies (WA)”
Proof. We have to show that for any auction process AP and any bids bA ≤ bC we have
AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidCσbC ] ≈l AP ′ [BσidAσbC |BσidCσbA ]
Suppose that for any auction process AP and any bids bA, bB ≤ bC we have
AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidCσbC ] ≈l AP ′ [BσidAσbC |BσidCσbB ]
We set bB = bA to conclude.
C Proof of “(SBPS) implies (BPU)”
Proof. As we have (SBPS), suppose for any auction process AP and any bids bA, bB < bC we have
AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidCσbC ] ≈l AP ′ [BσidAσbB |BσidCσbC ]
We have to show that for any auction process AP and any bids bA, bB < bC we have
AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidBσbB |BσidCσbC ] ≈l AP ′ [BσidAσbB |BσidBσbA |BσidCσbC ]
Applying the hypothesis, can conclude as follows:
AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidBσbB |BσidCσbC ]
≈l AP ′ [BσidAσbB |BσidBσbB |BσidCσbC ]
≈l AP ′ [BσidAσbB |BσidBσbA |BσidCσbC ]
D Proof of “(SA) implies (SBPS)”
Proof. We have to show (SBPS), i.e. that for any auction process AP and any bids bA, bB < bC we have
AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidCσbC ] ≈l AP ′ [BσidAσbB |BσidCσbC ]
Suppose that for any auction process AP and any bids bA, bB ≤ bC we have
AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidCσbC ] ≈l AP ′ [BσidAσbC |BσidCσbB ]
Then we can conclude as follows.
AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidCσbC ]
≈l AP ′ [BσidAσbC |BσidCσbB ]
≈l AP ′ [BσidAσbB |BσidCσbC ]
18
E Proof of “(WA) implies (BPU)”
Proof. We have to show that for any auction process AP and any bids bA, bB < bC we have
AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidBσbB |BσidCσbC ] ≈l AP ′ [BσidAσbB |BσidBσbA |BσidCσbC ]
Assume that for any auction process AP and any bids bA ≤ bC we have
AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidCσbC ] ≈l AP ′ [BσidAσbC |BσidCσbA ]
Then we can proceed as follows.
AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidBσbB |BσidCσbC ]
≈l AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidBσbC |BσidCσbB ]
≈l AP ′ [BσidAσbC |BσidBσbA |BσidCσbB ]
≈l AP ′ [BσidAσbB |BσidBσbA |BσidCσbC ]
F Proof of Theorem 1: “(P) is equivalent to (SA) if (FPSBA) holds.”
Proof. Suppose an electronic auction protocol ensures (P), i.e. if for any two auction processes APA =
νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . | Bσidkσbk,A | S | A1 | . . . | Al) and APB = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,B | . . . | Bσidkσbk,B | S
| A1 | . . . | Al) we have
AP1|res ≈l AP2|res ⇒ AP1 ≈l AP2
We want to show (SA), i.e. that for any an auction process AP and any bids bA, bB ≤ bC we have
AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidCσbC ] ≈l AP ′ [BσidAσbC |BσidCσbB ]
We can see that both sides have the same maximal bid, hence by (FPSBA) we obtain that AP1|res ≈l
AP2|res, which allows to conclude using (P).
Suppose that we have (SA) and we want to show (P). Suppose AP1|res ≈l AP2|res, then by (FPSBA)
the maximal bids on both sides are the same. If the winning bidder has not changed, only losing bids may
have changed, and we can use a sequence of applications of (SA) to conclude (as in the proof of (SA)
implies (SBPS)). If the winning bidder has changed, (SA) allows us to swap the winning bid, and then – as
above – we can use a sequence of applications of (SA) to conclude.
G Proof of “(RF-SA) implies (SA)”
In the following proofs we will make use of the following two Lemmas by [12]:
Lemma 1 ([12]). Let C1 = νu˜1.(_|B1) and C2 = νu˜2.(_|B2) be two evaluation contexts such that
u˜1 ∩ (fv(B2) ∪ fn(B2)) = ∅ and u˜2 ∩ (fv(B1) ∪ fn(B1)) = ∅. Then we have C1[C2[A]] ≡ C2[C1[A]]
for any extended process A.
Lemma 2 ([12]). Let P be a closed plain process and ch a channel name such that ch /∈ fn(P )∪ bn(P ).
We have (P ch)\out(ch,·) ≈l P .
The technique used is similar to the proof of RF ⇒ P in [12]:
Proof. We have to show that for any auction process AP and any bids bA, bB ≤ bC we have
AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidCσbC ] ≈l AP ′ [BσidAσbC |BσidCσbB ]
By hypothesis we have for any two auction processes APA = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . | Bσidkσbk,A
| S | A1 | . . . | Al) and APB = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,B | . . . | Bσidkσbk,B | S | A1 | . . . | Al) such that
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maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B and for any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , k} there exist processes B′i such that we have
∀i ∈ I : B′\out(chci,·)i ≈l Bσidiσbi,B and
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
(Bσidiσvi,A)
chci
]
≈l AP ′B
[
|
i∈I
B′i
]
We can easily see that if we choose APA and APB to fit the definition of (SA), we have maxi bi,A =
maxi bi,B , hence we can choose I = {idC} and have a corresponding B′idC .
We apply the context νchcidC (_|!in(chcidC , x)) on both sides, which gives
AP ′
[
BσidAσbA |(BσidCσbC )chcidC
]\out(chcidC ,·) = AP ′A [(BσidCσvC )chcidC ]\out(chcidC ,·)
≈l
AP ′B
[
B′idC
]\out(chcidC ,·) = AP ′ [BσidAσbC |B′idC ]\out(chcidC ,·)
By using Lemma 1 we obtain
AP ′
[
BσidAσbA |(BσidCσbC )chci
]\out(chcidC ,·)
≡
AP ′
[
BσidAσbA |
(
(BσidBσbC )
chci
)\out(chcidC ,·)]
and
AP ′
[
BσidAσbC |B′idC
]\out(chcidC ,·) ≡ AP ′ [BσidAσbC |(B′idC )\out(chcidC ,·)]
We can now apply Lemma 2 and use the fact that labeled bisimilarity is closed under structural equivalence
and obtain
AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidBσbC ] ≈l AP ′
[
BσidAσbC |(B′idC )\out(chcidC ,·)
]
where we can use B
′\out(chcidC ,·)
idC
≈l BσidCσbB to conclude.
H Proof of “(RF-BPS) implies (SRF)”
Proof. By hypothesis we have for any two auction processes APA = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . | Bσidkσbk,A
| S | A1 | . . . | Al) and APB = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,B | . . . | Bσidkσbk,B | S | A1 | . . . | Al) such that
maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B and for any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , k} there exist processes B′i such that we have
∀i ∈ I : B′\out(chci,·)i ≈l Bσidiσbi,B and
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
(Bσidiσvi,A)
chci
]
≈l AP ′B
[
|
i∈I
B′i
]
We have to show that for any auction process AP and any bids bA, bB < bC there exists a process B′ such
that B′\out(chc,·) ≈l BσidAσbB and
AP ′
[
(BσidAσbA)
chc |BσidCσbC
]
≈l AP ′ [B′|BσidCσbC ]
We can conclude by settingAPA =AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidCσbC ], APB =AP ′ [BσidAσbC |BσidCσbB ] and
I = {idC}, where obviously maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B holds.
I Proof of “(SRF) implies (SBPS)”
Proof. We have to show that for any auction process AP and any bids bA, bB < bC we have
AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidCσbC ] ≈l AP ′ [BσidAσbB |BσidCσbC ]
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By hypothesis we have that for any auction process AP and any bids bA, bB < bC there exists a process
B′ such that B′\out(chc,·) ≈l BσidAσbB and
AP ′
[
(BσidAσbA)
chc |BσidCσbC
]
≈l AP ′ [B′|BσidCσbC ]
We apply the context νchcidC (_|!in(chcidC , x)) on both sides, which gives
AP ′
[
(BσidAσbA)
chc|BσidCσbC
]\out(chc,·)
≈l
AP ′ [B′|BσidCσbC ]\out(chc,·)
By using Lemma 1 we obtain
AP ′
[
(BσidAσbA)
chc|BσidCσbC
]\out(chc,·)
≡
AP ′
[(
(BσidAσbA)
chc
)\out(chc,·) |BσidCσbC]
and
AP ′ [B′|BσidCσbC ]\out(chc,·) ≡ AP ′
[
(B′)\out(chc,·)|BσidCσbC
]
We can now apply Lemma 2 and use the fact that labeled bisimilarity is closed under structural equivalence
and obtain
AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidCσbC ] ≈l AP ′
[
(B′)\out(chc,·)|BσidCσbC
]
where we can use (B′)\out(chc,·) ≈l BσidAσbB to conclude.
J Proof of “(RF-U) implies (BPU)”
Proof. We have to show that for any auction process AP and any bids bA, bB < bC we have
AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidBσbB |BσidCσbC ] ≈l AP ′ [BσidAσbB |BσidBσbA |BσidCσbC ]
By hypothesis we have for any two auction processes APA = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . | Bσidkσbk,A | S
| A1 | . . . | Al) and APB = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,B | . . . | Bσidkσbk,B | S | A1 | . . . | Al) such that there exists
j with bj,A = bj,B = maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B and a permutation Π with ∀i : bi,B = bΠ(i),A, and for any
subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , j−1, j+1, . . . k}, there exist processesB′i such that we have ∀i ∈ I : B′\out(chci,·)i ≈l
Bσidiσbi,B and
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
(Bσidiσvi,A)
chci
]
≈l AP ′B
[
|
i∈I
B′i
]
We can easily see that if we choose APA and APB to fit the definition of (BPU), we have a j with bj,A =
bj,B = maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B and a permutation Π with ∀i : bi,B = bΠ(i),A, hence we can choose
I = {idA} (where idA 6= j and have a corresponding B′idA .
We apply the context νchcidA(_|!in(chcidA , x)) on both sides, which gives
AP ′
[
(BσidAσbA)
chcidA |BσidBσbB |BσidCσbC
]\out(chcidA ,·)
=
AP ′A
[
(BσidAσvA)
chcidA
]\out(chcidA ,·)
≈l
AP ′B
[
B′idA
]\out(chcidA ,·)
=
AP ′
[
B′idA |BσidBσbA |BσidCσbC
]\out(chcidA ,·)
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By using Lemma 1 we obtain
AP ′
[
(BσidAσbA)
chcidA |BσidBσbB |BσidCσbC
]\out(chcidA ,·)
≡
AP ′
[(
(BσidAσbA)
chcidA
)\out(chcidA ,·) |BσidBσbB |BσidCσbC]
and
AP ′
[
B′idA |BσidBσbA |BσidCσbC
]\out(chcidA ,·)
≡
AP ′
[
(B′idA)
\out(chcidA ,·)|BσidBσbA |BσidCσbC
]
We can now apply Lemma 2 and use the fact that labeled bisimilarity is closed under structural equivalence
and obtain
AP ′ [BσidAσbA |BσidBσbB |BσidCσbC ] ≈l AP ′
[
(B′idA)
\out(chcidA ,·)|BσidBσbA |BσidCσbC
]
where we can use B
′\out(chcidA ,·)
idA
≈l BσidAσbB to conclude.
K Proof of “(RF-WA) implies (WA)”
Proof. As the proof of “(RF-SA) implies (SA)”, but with bB = bA.
L Proof of “(RF) implies (P)”
Proof. We need to show that for any two auction processes APA = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . | Bσidkσbk,A |
S | A1 | . . . | Al) and APB = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,B | . . . | Bσidkσbk,B | S | A1 | . . . | Al) we have
AP1|res ≈l AP2|res ⇒ AP1 ≈l AP2
We assume that for any two auction processesAPA = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . |Bσidkσbk,A | S |A1 | . . .
| Al) and APB = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,B | . . . | Bσidkσbk,B | S | A1 | . . . | Al) and any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , k},
there exist processes B′i such that we have
∀i ∈ I : B′\out(chci,·)i ≈l Bσidiσbi,B
and APA|res ≈l APB |res ⇒ AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
(Bσidiσbi,A)
chci
]
≈l AP ′B
[
|
i∈I
B′i
]
.
Assume APA|res ≈l APB |res, we need to show that APA ≈l APB . We use (RF) and apply the
contexts νchci(_|!in(chci, x)) for all i ∈ I on both sides, which gives
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
(Bσidiσbi,A)
chci
]\i∈Iout(chci,·)
≈l
AP ′B
[
|
i∈I
B′i
]\i∈Iout(chci,·)
By using Lemma 1 we obtain
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
(Bσidiσbi,A)
chci
]\i∈Iout(chci,·)
≡
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
(
(Bσidiσbi,A)
chci
)\out(chci,·)]
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and
AP ′B
[
|
i∈I
B′i
]\i∈Iout(chci,·)
≡
AP ′B
[
|
i∈I
(B′i)
\out(chci,·)
]
We can now apply Lemma 2 and use the fact that labeled bisimilarity is closed under structural equivalence
and obtain
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
Bσidiσbi,A
]
≈l AP ′B
[
|
i∈I
(B′i)
\out(chci,·)
]
where we can use that for all i B′\out(chci,·)i ≈l Bσidiσbi,B to conclude.
M Proof of “(RF) is equivalent to (RF-SA) if (FPSBA) holds.”
Proof. Suppose an electronic auction protocol ensures (RF), i.e. if for any two auction processes APA =
νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . | Bσidkσbk,A | S | A1 | . . . | Al) and APB = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,B | . . . | Bσidkσbk,B | S
| A1 | . . . | Al) and any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , k}, there exist processes B′i such that we have
∀i ∈ I : B′\out(chci,·)i ≈l Bσidiσbi,B
and APA|res ≈l APB |res ⇒ AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
(Bσidiσbi,A)
chci
]
≈l AP ′B
[
|
i∈I
B′i
]
. We want to show (RF-SA),
i.e. that for any two auction processes APA = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . | Bσidkσbk,A | S | A1 | . . . | Al) and
APB = νn˜
′.(Bσid1σb1,B | . . . | Bσidkσbk,B | S | A1 | . . . | Al) such that maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B and for
any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , k} there exist processesB′i such that we have ∀i ∈ I : B′\out(chci,·)i ≈l Bσidiσbi,B
and
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
(Bσidiσvi,A)
chci
]
≈l AP ′B
[
|
i∈I
B′i
]
Assume such APA and APB , then maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B , hence by (FPSBA) we obtain that AP1|res ≈l
AP2|res, which allows to conclude using (RF).
Suppose that we have (RF-SA) and we want to show (RF). By (FPSBA) if we have AP1|res ≈l
AP2|res, we have maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B , hence we can conclude using (RF-SA).
N Proof of “(CR/RF-SA) implies (CR/RF-WA)”, “(CR/RF-BPS) im-
plies (CR/RF-U)”, “(CR/RF-SA) implies (CR/RF-BPS)”, “(CR/RF-
WA) implies (CR/RF-U)”
Proof. The only difference between these pairs is the restriction on the bids and I:
• if XXX=BPS (Bidding-Price-Secrecy), there exists a j with bj,A = bj,B = maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B
and for any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . k},
• if XXX=U (Unlinkability), there exists j with bj,A = bj,B = maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B and a permuta-
tion Π with ∀i : bi,B = bΠ(i),A, and for any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . k},
• if XXX=SA (Strong Anonymity), maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B and for any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , k},
• if XXX=WA (Weak Anonymity), here exists a permutation Π with ∀i : bi,B = bΠ(i),A, and for any
subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , k},
It is easy to see that SA includes WA, that BPS includes U, that SA includes BPS, and finally that WA
includes U.
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O Proof of “(CR) is equivalent to (CR-SA) if (FPSBA) holds.”
Proof. Suppose an electronic auction protocol ensures (CR), i.e. if for any two auction processes APA =
νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . | Bσidkσbk,A | S | A1 | . . . | Al) and APB = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,B | . . . | Bσidkσbk,B
| S | A1 | . . . | Al) and any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , k}, there exists processes B′i such that for any contexts
Ci, i ∈ I with Ci = νc1.νc2.(_|Pi), n˜ ∩ fn(C) = ∅ and
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
Ci
[
(Bσidiσbi,A)
c1,c2
]] ≈l AP ′A [ |
i∈I
(Bσidiσbi,A)
chci
]
we have ∀i ∈ I : Ci [B′i]\out(chci,·) ≈l Bσidiσvi,B and
APA|res ≈l APB |res ⇒ AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
Ci
[
(Bσidiσvi,A)
c1,c2
]] ≈l AP ′B [ |
i∈I
Ci [B
′
i]
]
We want to show (CR-SA), i.e. that for any two auction processes APA = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . |
Bσidkσbk,A | S | A1 | . . . | Al) and APB = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,B | . . . | Bσidkσbk,B | S | A1 | . . . | Al)
such that maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B and for any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , k} there exist processes B′i such that for
any contexts Ci, i ∈ I with Ci = νc1.νc2.(_|Pi), n˜ ∩ fn(C) = ∅ and
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
Ci
[
(Bσidiσbi,A)
c1,c2
]] ≈l AP ′A [ |
i∈I
(Bσidiσbi,A)
chci
]
we have ∀i ∈ I : Ci [B′i]\out(chci,·) ≈l Bσidiσvi,B and
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
Ci
[
(Bσidiσvi,A)
c1,c2
]] ≈l AP ′B [ |
i∈I
Ci [B
′
i]
]
Assume such APA and APB , then maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B , hence by (FPSBA) we obtain that AP1|res ≈l
AP2|res, which allows to conclude using (CR).
Suppose that we have (CR-SA) and we want to show (CR). By (FPSBA) if we have AP1|res ≈l
AP2|res, we have maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B , hence we can conclude using (CR-SA).
P Proof of “(CR) implies (RF)”
The proof is similar to the proof of CR⇒ RF in [12].
Proof. Assume that for any two auction processes APA = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . | Bσidkσbk,A | S | A1 |
. . . |Al) andAPB = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,B | . . . |Bσidkσbk,B | S |A1 | . . . |Al) and any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , k},
there exists processes B′i such that for any contexts Ci, i ∈ I with Ci = νc1.νc2.(_|Pi), n˜ ∩ fn(C) = ∅
and
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
Ci
[
(Bσidiσbi,A)
c1,c2
]] ≈l AP ′A [ |
i∈I
(Bσidiσbi,A)
chci
]
we have ∀i ∈ I : Ci [B′i]\out(chci,·) ≈l Bσidiσvi,B and
APA|res ≈l APB |res ⇒ AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
Ci
[
(Bσidiσvi,A)
c1,c2
]] ≈l AP ′B [ |
i∈I
Ci [B
′
i]
]
We have to show that for any two auction processes APA = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . | Bσidkσbk,A | S | A1 |
. . . |Al) andAPB = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,B | . . . |Bσidkσbk,B | S |A1 | . . . |Al) and any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , k},
there exist processes B′i such that we have
∀i ∈ I : B′\out(chci,·)i ≈l Bσidiσbi,B
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and APA|res ≈l APB |res ⇒ AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
(Bσidiσvi,A)
chci
]
≈l AP ′B
[
|
i∈I
B′i
]
.
Let Ci, i ∈ I be evaluation contexts with Ci = νc1.νc2.(_|Pi), n˜ ∩ fn(C) = ∅ and
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
Ci
[
(Bσidiσbi,A)
c1,c2
]] ≈l AP ′A [ |
i∈I
(Bσidiσbi,A)
chci
]
Note that such a C can be constructed directly from the bidders process B. By hypothesis we know that
there are closed plain processes B′i such that
∀i ∈ I : Ci [B′i]\out(chci,·) ≈l Bσidiσvi,B
and
APA|res ≈l APB |res ⇒ AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
Ci
[
(Bσidiσvi,A)
c1,c2
]] ≈l AP ′B [ |
i∈I
Ci [B
′
i]
]
We have to find other processes B′′i such that
∀i ∈ I : B′′\out(chci,·)i ≈l Bσidiσbi,B
and
APA|res ≈l APB |res ⇒ AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
(Bσidiσvi,A)
chci
]
≈l AP ′B
[
|
i∈I
B′i
]
Let ∀iB′′i = Ci[B′i]. This directly fulfills the first requirement. Assume APA|res ≈l APB |res. We now
use the hypotheses
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
Ci
[
(Bσidiσbi,A)
c1,c2
]] ≈l AP ′A [ |
i∈I
(Bσidiσbi,A)
chci
]
and
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
Ci
[
(Bσidiσvi,A)
c1,c2
]] ≈l AP ′B [ |
i∈I
Ci [B
′
i]
]
As labeled bisimilarity is transitive, we can conclude
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
(Bσidiσbi,A)
chci
]
≈l AP ′B
[
|
i∈I
Ci [B
′
i]
]
which gives us the desired result for B′′i = Ci[B
′
i].
Q Proof of “(CR-XXX) implies (RF-XXX)”
Proof. Assume that for any two auction processes APA = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . | Bσidkσbk,A | S | A1 |
. . . | Al) and APB = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,B | . . . | Bσidkσbk,B | S | A1 | . . . | Al) such that
• if XXX=BPS (Bidding-Price Secrecy): there exists a j with bj,A = bj,B = maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B
and for any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . k},
• if XXX=U (Unlinkability): there exists a j with bj,A = bj,B = maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B and there
exists a permutation Π with ∀i : bi,B = bΠ(i),A and for any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . k},
• if XXX=SA (Strong Anonymity): maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B and for any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , k},
• if XXX=WA (Weak Anonymity): there exists a permutation Π with ∀i : bi,B = bΠ(i),A and for any
subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , k},
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there exist processes B′i such that for any contexts Ci, i ∈ I with Ci = νc1.νc2.(_|Pi), n˜ ∩ fn(C) = ∅
and
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
Ci
[
(Bσidiσbi,A)
c1,c2
]] ≈l AP ′A [ |
i∈I
(Bσidiσbi,A)
chci
]
we have ∀i ∈ I : Ci [B′i]\out(chci,·) ≈l Bσidiσvi,B and
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
Ci
[
(Bσidiσvi,A)
c1,c2
]] ≈l AP ′B [ |
i∈I
Ci [B
′
i]
]
We have to show that for any two auction processes APA = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,A | . . . | Bσidkσbk,A | S | A1 |
. . . | Al) and APB = νn˜′.(Bσid1σb1,B | . . . | Bσidkσbk,B | S | A1 | . . . | Al) such that
• if XXX=BPS (Bidding-Price-Secrecy), there exists a j with bj,A = bj,B = maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B
and for any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . k},
• if XXX=U (Unlinkability), there exists j with bj,A = bj,B = maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B and a permuta-
tion Π with ∀i : bi,B = bΠ(i),A, and for any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . k},
• if XXX=SA (Strong Anonymity), maxi bi,A = maxi bi,B and for any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , k},
• if XXX=WA (Weak Anonymity), there exists a permutation Π with ∀i : bi,B = bΠ(i),A, and for any
subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , k},
there exist processes B′i such that we have ∀i ∈ I : B′\out(chci,·)i ≈l Bσidiσbi,B and
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
(Bσidiσvi,A)
chci
]
≈l AP ′B
[
|
i∈I
B′i
]
Since the conditions on the σbi,X and I depending on the parameter XXX are the same in both cases
(CR and RF), we can proceed independently of XXX. Let Ci, i ∈ I be evaluation contexts with Ci =
νc1.νc2.(_|Pi), n˜ ∩ fn(C) = ∅ and
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
Ci
[
(Bσidiσbi,A)
c1,c2
]] ≈l AP ′A [ |
i∈I
(Bσidiσbi,A)
chci
]
Note that such a C can be constructed directly from the bidders process B. By hypothesis we know that
there are closed plain processes B′i such that
∀i ∈ I : Ci [B′i]\out(chci,·) ≈l Bσidiσvi,B
and
APA|res ≈l APB |res ⇒ AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
Ci
[
(Bσidiσvi,A)
c1,c2
]] ≈l AP ′B [ |
i∈I
Ci [B
′
i]
]
We have to find other processes B′′i such that
∀i ∈ I : B′′\out(chci,·)i ≈l Bσidiσbi,B
and
APA|res ≈l APB |res ⇒ AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
(Bσidiσvi,A)
chci
]
≈l AP ′B
[
|
i∈I
B′i
]
Let ∀iB′′i = Ci[B′i]. This directly fulfills the first requirement. Assume APA|res ≈l APB |res. We now
use the hypotheses
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
Ci
[
(Bσidiσbi,A)
c1,c2
]] ≈l AP ′A [ |
i∈I
(Bσidiσbi,A)
chci
]
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and
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
Ci
[
(Bσidiσvi,A)
c1,c2
]] ≈l AP ′B [ |
i∈I
Ci [B
′
i]
]
As labeled bisimilarity is transitive, we can conclude
AP ′A
[
|
i∈I
(Bσidiσbi,A)
chci
]
≈l AP ′B
[
|
i∈I
Ci [B
′
i]
]
which gives us the desired result for B′′i = Ci[B
′
i].
27
